



PARTNMISHIP - B=~l ANDf NOTM,
§1. A partiership exists w!Aever two or morepeur
unite skill, labor or property in an undertaking, aud partial.
pate in its profits; unless such participation in the pr.tabe
by way of services ps an employee -without interext in, ocontrol of, the subject matter, in whioh case the perti,"pant ip
not a paFtner. OgdeM V. Astor, 4 Sandf. 811; "arbi. v.
Hal 4 20 Wend. 70. Partners are of severalkinds. , Actual
and ostensible.- I. Secret or dormant. inI. Nwninal r
ostensible. IV. General. V. Special or limite. VL it*.
tired.
§ 2. In the first case, where the partner is both ad i mad
ostensihle, there can be no difficulty in fixing his liability,
which is palpable, although his name- may not be expressed.
in the style of the firm. &cret or dormant partners arejust
as liable, when they are discovered, as those who are ostenf&
ble, because, partioipating as they do in the profits, they ar
held equally'liable for losses. But in case of withdrawal
from the firm, no notice is necessary, the secrecy of their con-
nection with it rendering it superfluous. Davis v. Allen, 8
Comstock 168; Mragill v. Mrrnie, 5 B. Monroe 168; &ott v
Colmisnil, T J.J. Marshall 416.
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§ 3. A mere nominal or ostensible partner is as much bound
by the negotiable paper, or other engagements of the firm, as
if actual; for if he suffer himself to be held out to the world
as a member, he authorizes third persons to regard him as a
contracting party. If such partner desires to avoid liability,
he must give due notice that he is not an actual partner.
§ 4. A generalpartnership is such as exists by operation of
law. when two or more persons combine in an undertaking
and share the profits, and in which all are jointly and severally
bound for all the partnership debts. A special or limited
partnership is one in which the special partner contributes to
the common stock a specific sum in actual cash, and is liable
only to that extent for the debts of the partnership. This
privilege is granted by statute in most of the States, being
unknown to the common law, and is accompanied by strin-
gent conditions. Edwards on Bills & Notes 106-7.
§ 5. Retiredpartners must give notice of withdrawal from
the firm-otherwise they will be bound. This notice should
be given by letter or circular to all business correspondents
who have dealings with the firm; and by advertisement to
those who know it only by general reputation. Edwards on
Bills 116; 1 Parsons Notes & Bills 143.
Partner may Bind Firm in Copartnership Business.
§6. One partner may bind all of his copartners in any
transaction and by any instrument not under seal, within the
scope of the partnership business; and may assign, accept,
indorse, present, demand, or receive payment of negotiable
"papdrs in the partnership name. And if a bill be drawn upon
.a firm, the acceptance by one partner, whether in his own
name or the name of the firm. is binding upon the firm, it
being only necessary for it to appear that he acted for it.
.eroy v. Johnston, 15 Peters 197; Mason v. Bumney 1 Camp.
384 ; Jenkins v. Morris, 16 M. & W. 877.. The drawing of
a bill of exchange by one partner in his own name upon the
firm of which he is a member, it has been held, is in contempla-
tion of law, an acceptance of the bill by the drawer in behalf
of the firm. Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day 511.
§ 7. The general authority of a partner to bind the firm
springs from the mutual agency of the copartners for each
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other; and from the course and usage of ;he business -in
-which they are engaged. It follows, therefore, that a persop
contemplating partnership with another cpuot,- ithoat a
.special authority, bind him .by a contract for ,the jrop6se
partnership benefit; for example, for the purpse 
of ras,
capital-his agency not commencing until the cgnnscti'o.' is
consummated. Greenslade v. Dower, 7 B. 0. 605. The co-
partnership being formed the copartner can bind his associ-
ates only in such transactions as pertain to their pawnershi.p
business; and the copartnership usiness must be 6f Xipkli
character that the giving of n eg tiable 'paper would'o13e t
convenient and proper mode of conducting it, in order~tp cn.e
the .presumption of agency m a copartnbr to give a 1~$1 or
note in the firm's name. Thus the U. S. Supreme CoiuVE
that a bill. drawn by a partner in. the name of~a ,m ag~ d
in .farmipg, working a steam .saw mill and in tratlig, Wa
binding, because trading and running the mill r~qur . cap.
tal and the use qf credit; but if the firm had been eng% d
in farming alone, no one partner could have bouAA
bill or -ote. Kimbro v. Bullitt, .22 Howard 256.
§ 8. For these reasons Dne of a law partneriw p. 4 nnt 1N
the firm by a promispo.ry-.pote: L .Iy v. P . Car. * .
453; Hedley v. Baindg,$.3QJL. E. 0.1. I,) . che
one of a firm practid'ng.me4icipe bind it in f 1W
except for medicine 4nd other necessaries of l:ioq.
Crdsthwait v. Ros, 1 Hunmph. -23; ior oa one of ,o
keeping tavern bind his copartners except strictly .ithin
the business; Coake. v. B.ranoh..Bank, 3 Ala. 175. -It i.sai
however, that if the concerns were of suph vast mag'Ntd6,y
.to require large capital and cyedittheiule would-be f ,ooo-
ful application, anjd that it would depend very muh uqp6n#e
usageof the particular firm an. others similarlyenga ged. 1Par-
sons, N. and B. 139. The general authority of 'sipartner to bind
the firm exists only .y implication, and may be rebutted by
evidence that the party who took the secuity .a.pvious
notice that no such thoriti 'eiisted.V iltway v. a zi,
10 East. 264; Kinj v. 4e,2 iN6. 21.$
§9. A u otebegin 'i pro ," d aiga byoj ie'si
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the firm for the rest, as A. B. for C. D., E. F., &c., will bind
the firm. Gallway v. .Afatthew, 10 East 264, 1 Camp. 403;
Staats v. Howlett, 4 Denio 559 ; and will not bind the separate
partner singly; In re Clarke, 14 M. & W. 469, overruling
Hall v. Smith, 1 B. & C. 407. So if it begins, "I promise,"
and is signed by the firm's name. Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns.
544. And if a partner draws a bill or note in a fictitious
name and indorse the partnership name, the firm will be bound
by the indorsement. Thickenesse v. Bromilowe, 2 Cromp. &
J. 425. If the partner intending to use the firm's name
make a slight and immaterial variation from it, the firm
is still bound; Williamson v. Johnson, 1 B. & C. 146; Faith
v. Richmond, 11 A. & E. 339; Forbes v. Ifarshall, 11 Exch.
166; but if the variation is material it will not be. Kirk
v. Blurton, 9 M. & W. 284; .faclae v. Sutherland, 3 Ellis &
B. 31. If A., B. and C. are partners, a note given by one of
them signed A. & Co. will be presumed to be in the partner-
ship name. Drake v. Elwyn, 1 Caines 184. And if the
names of all the partners are written on the paper instead of
the firm's name, the firm will be bound. Norton v. Seymour,
3 C. B. 792. One partner cannot, without special authority,
execute a joint and separate note in the partnership name;
Perring v. Hone, 2 C. & P. 401, 4 Bing. 28 (13 E. C. R. L.); but
it has been held-and justly as we think-that such a note
would'be void only as a several note, and good as a joint note.
Thaclae v. Sutherland, 3 El. & B. 36 (77 E. C. L. R.).
§ 10. If one partner obtains money by representing the sig.
nature to be that of the firm, and misapplies it, he will com-
mit a fraud on his co-partners; but they will be liable to all
bonafide holders without notice, as the partnership existence
enabled him to commit it. U. S. Bank v. Binney, 5 Mason
176; Buckner v. Lee, 8 Ga. 285.
Cases of the Name of an Individual Used as a Style of Firm.
§ 11. Sometimes the partnership transacts business in the
name of a single partner, and questions often arise whether
or not paper executed in the name of the single partner was
intended as his only, or as that of the firm.
Primafacie it is presumed to be the paper of the individual
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partner alone. Cunningham v. Smithson, 12 Leigh 43; Aanu.
facturers Bank v. Winship, 5 Pick. 11; Boylev. Skinner, 19
Misso. 82 ; Mercantile Bank v. Cox, 38 Maine 50,0; Buckner Y.
Lee, 8 Georgia 285; U. S. Bank.v. Binney, 5.Mason 176;
Bank of Bochester v. Monaalh,1 Deftib402. Butif.itis shown
to have been executed in the business of the firm, and that
he intended to sign it as a partner, it will be considered the
firm's paper. South Carolina Bank v. Case, 8 B. & 0. 427.
§ 12. If a person is a partner in two firms, the one firm can-
not sue the other at law, as the names of all the inembers;
whether appearing in the firm's name or not, must beset forth
in the declaration, and the same party. cannot be both a plain-
tiff and a defendant; Pitcher v. Barrows, 17 Pick. 861; Bab.
cock v. Stone,3 McLean 172; Mainwaring v. Newman, 2 B,
& P. 120;. Neale v. Turton, 4 .Bing. 149; Afoffat v. -al
Milligan, 2 B. & P. 124. The remedy would belin equity,
In some States, however, as in Pennsylvania, the comiion la.
has beeh changed by statute, so that an-action will lie.
But this d itichlty ceases when the instrumdit passes to i
third party, who may sue both firms: Pitch& *Brrouw, 17f
Pick. 861; Davis v. Bri ygs; 39 Maine 304.! Ald when there
is a good defense against one 'of several partners it applies
equally to all, although the others may -have been entirely
innoc6nt of complicity in the fraud of the on.;r -1iAhe been
themselves its- victims; Richmond v. Reapy, 1 Stark. 204 4
Brandon v. Scott, 7 E. & B. 234 , (90 E. 0. IL R1) Aoi&~y-vj
J7ohns6on, 5 H. & N. 137.
§13. Copartners may enter into any contitnct beiiiein thei;
selves restrainingthe firm, or any member of t, from executing
orindorsinga negotiable instrument; andit is a fraud upon'the
firm for any member to violate it, for which hisinjured co-
partners may maintain an actioh. Byles on Bills (Sharswood's
ed.) 128. But in the hands of a bona fide holder, without no-
tice, the fact that partnership articles have been violated is
no objection to the validity of the. instrument, or his right to
recover; for their 'association with the wrong-doer enabled
him to commit the fraud. Michigan Ban1 v..Rdred, 9 Wal-
lace 544; Kimbro v. Bullit, 22 Howard 256;: Wimmp v.
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Bank U. S., 5 Peters 529; Catskill Bank v. Stall, 15 Wend.
364, and 18 Wend. 466; Waldo Bank v. Lambert, 16 Maine
416; Bascom v. Young, 7 Misso. 1; Cotton v. Evans, 1 Dev.
& B. Eq. 284; Miller v. Hughes, I A. K. Marsh. 181.
§ 14. No one member of a firm can, without the consent
of his copartners, bind them by executing a bill or note for
his private debt in the partnership name; and the creditor
who receives such an instrument participates in the wrong.
In order to recover upon it he must prove the assent of the
copartners. Smith v. Strader, 4 Howard 404; Sweetser v.
French, 2 Cush. 309; Rogers v. Batchelor, 12 Peters 229;
Poindexter v. Waddy, 6 Munf. 418; Foot v. Sabin, 19 Johns.
154; Taylor v. Hillyer, 3 Blackf. 433; Noble v" McClintock,
2 Watts & S. 152; Mfaudlin v. Branch Bank, 2 Ala. 502;
Tilliams v. Gilchrist, 11 N. H. 535; Baird v. Cochran, 4
Sergt. & R. 397. This seems to us the rule established by
tJie. English authorities; also, See Bayley on Bills, p. 43;
Chitty on Bills (13 Am. Ed.) 60-61, and cases cited by those
authors, although there are cases to the contrary. Swan v.
Steele, 7 East 210; Ridley v. Taylor, 13 East 175, which are
cited by Professor Parsons, 1 N. & B. 127, with evident dis-
approbation. The cases cited by Bayley and Chitty fully sus-
tain the text. Swan v. Steele, however, may be distinguished
from the other case, the instrument being for a larger amount
than the private debt, and having been executed some time
previous to the transaction.
Distinct proof is required of the assent of the copartners-
mere knowledge of the transaction, it has been held, is not
sufficient. Elliott v. Dudley, 19 Barb. 326. But unless they
were prompt to repudiate it, we should say they were bound.
Foster v. Andrews, 2 Penn. 160. And their assent may be im-
plied from circumstances. Gansevoort v. Williams, 14 Wend.
133. A course of dealing of the firm in recognizing such ac-
commodation paper as theirs, orin executing it, would suffice;
Butler v. Stocking, 4 Selden 108; Edwards on Bills 105; and
when such a course of dealing has been proved, evidence that
the partnership articles prohibited it, would be inadmissible.
Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wallace 544.
The admnissions of the partner executing partnership paper
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for his private debt are no evidence to bind the firm. Hick-
man v. Reineking, 6 Blackf. 387.
§ 15. If the firm receive and hold the proceeds of negotia-
ble paper, executed by one of their number in a transaction
not in their business, the firm will be considered w ratifying
the act and will be bound; Richardson v. FreftbA, 4 Met. 577;
Clay v. Cottrell, 18 Penn. 408; Whitaker v. Brouwi, 16 Wend..
505; and this is the rule whether the papei be signed
by the partner in his own name or the' rm'g ; ddeman v.
Bank of iid&letown, 28 Penn. 44:0; and likewisb if-they delay
so long after having knoviledge of the the ttansmuttbni as to
raise a presumption that they ratify and adopt it. Foster r.
Andrews, 2 Penn. 160. But if as socin as the 61adhr partneft-
hear of the transaction they repudiate it they Will not' be
bound.
§ 16. Nor can any one member of the firm bnd thecopart-
nership by signing its firm name as drawerkjdorser or ic-
ceptor of a bill or note for accommoddtioii f a third party.
If the payee knew that the copartner signed th6 firm'A nanTe
for accommodation he cannot enforce paylneiht hgAitist
them without proving their assent. Bank 'Aochester V.
'Bowen, 7 Wend. 158. Chenowith v. Chamberlin, 6 B. Monroe
60 ; Beach v.. State Bank, 2 Ind. 488. If the paitiir add th6
word "surety" to the partnership name already signed t# a
bill or note, this stamps upon the paper an 1fidibatilon of Its
character; Foot v. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154; Austin* ' Va. Jr-
mark, 4 Hill 259 ; and where a bill or note is carrie y. th
.drawer or maker to a bank to get it discountdd on his'own ac-
.-ount, or transfer it to another party, and it bears the nae
:f a firm "which is payee and indofsed therein, the transaction
shows on its face that it is accoinmodation paper, and the btnk
or other holder must prove the copartners' assent in 6rder" to
bind them. Bank of l7ergennei v. Cameron, 7 Barb. 143;
Austin v. .randermark, 4 Hill 259; 1 Parsons N.;& B. 41.
But a bank discounting partnership paper for one partner
and placing the amount, to his credit would not be chargeable
with notice that he was acting in fraud of the fifta, or be're-
.ui.red to prove assent of his copartners. Exparte Bonbomue,
8 Vesdy 8412.
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§ 17. If the partnership engagement as surety or indorser
is really for the partnership benefit in their legitimate busi-
ness, the paper will be valid; Langan v. Hlewitt, 13 Smedes &
M. 122; and a single partner it has been held may renew
the paper executed by the consent of all for accommodation.
Dundas v. Gallagher, 4 Penn. St. R. 205.
The Burden of Proof.
§ 18. When the payee or holder of a bill or note executed
by a partner in the name of the firm exhibits it, and proves
the signature of the signing partner (where such proof is ne-
cessary) he establ ihes a Prima facie right to recover of the
partnership, it being presumed that the partner acted within
scope of the partnership business: Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns
544; Manning v. Hays, 6 Md. 5; Vallett v. Parcer, 6 Wend.
615; Knapp v. McBride, 7 Ala. 19; Foster v.Andrewq, 2Penn.
160; Hamilton v. Summers, 12 B. Monroe 11. If the copart-
nership resists payment, it must first show the fact that the
paper was executed for a private debt, for accommodation, in
violation of terms, or otherwise beyond the scope of the part-
nership business : Ibid. If the suit be brought by the payee, the
firm must go a step further and show that he knew the co-
partner was exceeding his authority: Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns.
544; Edwards on Bills, 105. The defense against the payee
is then established, and while the instrument would still be
valid in the hands of a subsequent holder, it has been held in
a number of American cases that he must show that he ac-
quired it bona fide for value without notice that the copart-
ner exceeded his powers: Bank of St. Albans v. Gillilands,
23 Wend. 311; Ban7 of Vergennes v. Cameron, 7 Barb. 143;
Monroe v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412; and some of the English au-
thorities are to the same effect; Hogg v. Skene, 34
L. J., C. P. 153; Grant v. Hawkces, Chitty on Bills (13th Am.
ed.) 55; Byles on Bills, (Sharswood's ed.) 129. But it is less
likely that the third party or indorsee should know the cir-
cumstances affecting the validity of the instrument, than that
the payee should know them, unless there was something on
the face of it to denote them; when of course all parties
would be chargeable with notice; and when suit is brought
544
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against the co-p~rtnership by an indorsee the burden of proof
should be imposed on the firm to show that the instrument
was not in its nature a partnership obligation, and that the
endorsee kmew its character: Michigan Bank v. ldred, 9
Wallace 544; A Tbeitz Y. Melokn, 1 Wright (Penn.) 367; Hmu-
grave v. Drake, 5 Q. B. 185 (48 E. C. L. R.) in which case
Lord DENMAN said: "Where issue is joined on the plea of
non acfpit and the proof offered of the acceptance is the sig-
nature of one partner competent to bind the firm, then, though
the'defendants show that this signature was a fraudulent
act on the pait of such partner, yet if the proof does not af.
fect the plaintiff with knowledge of the fraud, that doed not
put the plaintiff to an answer nor make it necessary for him
t9 give any explanation or account of the transactiokiJ' To
same effect is Thompson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 761.
Authbrity of a Partner Terminates with the Firm.
• 19. 'The power.of a partner ceases upon dissolution of
the firmj and the surviving partners can enter into no contract
which will bind the estate of the deceased except such as is
necessary -or appropriate in settling the affairs of th-6 concern.
Darling *. March, 22 Maine 184; Gannett T. Cunninghamn, 94
Maine 56. The power of -the surviving partners does not ex-
tend to giving a note: Lockiwood v. Comstock, 4 M1cIan 883
Lu k v. Smith, 8 Barb. 570; Mitchell v. Ostrom, 2 Mi 520;
Perrin v. Keene, 19 Maine 355; Hamilton -. Seaman,:1 Ind.
185 ; Bank of Pokt" Gibson v. Baugh, 9 Smedes & M. 290;
Contra, Robinson v. Taylor, 4 Barr 242; or accepting a billi
in the firm's name; Tombeckbee .Bank v. Dumell, 5 Mason'56,
nor according to the weight of authority can they renew a
bill or note of the firth: Parker v. Cousins, 2 Grat. 378;
Long v. Story, 10 Misso. 636; Stone v. Chamberlain, 20 Georgia
259 ; Martin v. Kirk, 2 Hump. 529 ; National Bank v. Nor-
ten, 1 Hill 572; Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio State 21 ; nor can
they inidorse bills and notes given to the firm before the dis-
sblution. Parker v. Macomber, 18 Pick. 505 ; .lumphres v.
Chastain, 5 Georgia 166; Sanford v. Mickles, 4 Johns. 224;
Abel v.'Sutton, 3"Esp. 108.
I § 20. It has been held, however, that after diisblution one
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partner may waive demand and notice: Darling v. Aarch, 22
Maine 184; acknowledge a balance due from the partnership:
Ide v. Ingraham, 5 Gray 106; and where the paper was drawn
in blank by one partner to the order of the firm and indorsed
before dissolution thatit might afterward be filled up and nego-
tiated: Usher v. Dancey, 4 Camp. 97; Lewis v. Reilly, 1 Q.
B. 349. But see Abel v. Sutton, 3 Esp. 108, and 1 Pars. N. &
B. 146-7. And notwithstanding the dissolution the act of the
ex-partner will bind the firm unless due notice of the dissolu-
tion had been given so as to affect the holder with knowledge.
If his indorser were not affected with notice neither would
the holder be. Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 300 ; Bristol v.
Sprague, 8 Wend. 423; Cony v. Wheelock, 33 Maine 366;
Whitman v. Leonard, 3 Pick. 177; Booth v. Quin, 7 Price 193;
Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 134.
§ 21. If authorized verbally or in writing, one ex-partner
may bind the firm after dissolution as party to a bill or note.
But general authority to settle or close up the firm's business
in the firm's name; or to settle all demands in favor of or
against it; or to use its name in liquidation of past business;
or any other general authority relating to winding up of the
partnership concerns does not extend authority to the execu-
tion or renewal of bills and note- in the firm's name. Parker
v. Cousins, 2 Grat. 372; Long v. Story, 10 Misso. 636; Pal-
mer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21 ; Lockwood v. Comstock, 4 McLean
383; National Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill 572; ifartin v. Kirk,
2 Humph. 529; Hamilton v. Seaman, 1 Ind. 185. Though
in England authority to use the partnership name was con-
sidered sufficient to leave it for a jury to say whether accord-
ing to usage and custom it would authorize a renewal in the
firm's name: IMyers v. Huggins, 1 Strob. 473.
In Pennsylvania, however, the courts hold that after disso-
lution a partner has free authority to borrow money: Davis
v. Desauque; 5 Whart. 530; and to execute or renew bills and
notes in settlement of the past business of the firm. Brown v.
Clark, 14 Penn. St. 469; Robinson v. Taylor, 4 Penn. St. 242.
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